Gespeichert in:
| Titel: | The bounds of reason game theory and the unification of the behavioral sciences |
|---|---|
| Von: |
Herbert Gintis
|
| Person: |
Gintis, Herbert
1940-2023 Verfasser aut |
| Hauptverfasser: | |
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Princeton, NJ [u.a.]
Princeton Univ. Press
2009
|
| Notation: | CM 5500 MR 1100 MR 2200 QH 430 SK 860 |
| Schlagwörter: | |
| Medienzugang: | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=017357867&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=017357867&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| Zusammenfassung: | Game theory cannot fully explain human behaviour and should instead complement other key concepts championed by the behavioral disciplines. Gintis shows that just as game theory without broader social theory is merely technical bravado, so social theory without game theory is a handicapped enterprise. |
| Umfang: | XVIII, 286 S. graph. Darst. |
| ISBN: | 9780691140520 0691140529 |
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| 650 | 7 | |a Sciences sociales - Méthodologie |2 ram | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Sozialwissenschaften | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Game theory | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Practical reason | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Human behavior | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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|---|---|
| DE-BY-UBR_katkey | 4577941 |
| DE-BY-UBR_location | UB Lesesaal Wirtschaft |
| DE-BY-UBR_media_number | 069037368067 |
| _version_ | 1835106998118514688 |
| adam_text | Contents
Preface
xiii
1
Decision Theory and Human Behavior
1
1.1
Beliefs, Preferences, and Constraints
4
1.2
The Meaning of Rational Action
6
1.3
Why Are Preferences Consistent?
7
1.4
Time Inconsistency
8
1.5
Bayesian Rationality and Subjective Priors
11
1.6
The Biological Basis for Expected Utility
16
1.7
The
Allais
and
Ellsberg
Paradoxes
16
1.8
Risk and the Shape of the Utility Function
18
1.9
Prospect Theory
21
1.10
Heuristics and Biases in Decision Making
26
2
Game Theory: Basic Concepts
30
2.1
The Extensive Form
30
2.2
The Normal Form
33
2.3
Mixed Strategies
34
2.4
Nash Equilibrium
35
2.5
The Fundamental Theorem of Game Theory
36
2.6
Solving for Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibria
37
2.7
Throwing Fingers
38
2.8
The Battle of the Sexes
38
2.9
The Hawk-Dove Game
39
2.10
The Prisoners Dilemma
40
2.11
Alice. Bob. and the Choreographer
41
2.12
An Efficiency-Enhancing Choreographer
43
2.13
The Correlated Equilibrium Solution Concept
44
3
Game Theory and Human Behavior
45
3.1
Self-and Other-Regarding Preferences
46
viii Contents
3.2
Methodological Issues in Behavioral Game Theory
49
3.3
An Anonymous Market Exchange
52
3.4
The Rationality of Altruistic Giving
54
3.5
Conditional Altruistic Cooperation
56
3.6
Altruistic Punishment
57
3.7
Strong Reciprocity in the Labor Market
59
3.8
Altruistic Third-Party Punishment
61
3.9
Altruism and Cooperation in Groups
64
3.10
Inequality Aversion
68
3.11
The Trust Game
71
3.12
Character Virtues
7 3
3.13
The Situational Character of Preferences
75
3.14
The Dark Side of Altruistic Cooperation
77
3.15
Norms of Cooperation: Cross-Cultural Variation
78
Rationalizability and Common Knowledge of Rationality
83
4.1
Epistemic
Games
83
4.2
A Simple
Epistemic
Game
86
4.3
An
Epistemic
Battle of the Sexes
87
4.4
Dominated and Iteratedly Dominated Strategies
88
4.5
Eliminating Weakly Dominated Strategies
89
4.6
Rationalizable Strategies
90
4.7
Eliminating Strongly Dominated Strategies
92
4.8
Common Knowledge of Rationality
93
4.9
Rationalizability and Common Knowledge of Rationality
94
4.10
The Beauty Contest
94
4.11
The Travelers Dilemma
95
4.12
The Modified Traveler s Dilemma
96
4.13
Global Games
98
4.14
CKR Is an Event. Not a Premise
100
Extensive Form Rationalizability
102
5.1
Backward Induction and Dominated Strategies
102
5.2
Subgame
Perfection
104
5.3
Subgame
Perfection and Incredible Threats
105
5.4
The Surprise Examination
105
5.5
The Common Knowledge of Logicality Paradox
106
5.6
The Repeated Prisoner s Dilemma
107
Contents ix
5.7
The Centipede Game
108
5.8
CKR Fails Off the Backward Induction Path
110
5.9
How to Play the Repeated Prisoner s Dilemma
112
5.10
The Modal Logic of Knowledge
114
5.11
Backward Induction and Extensive Form CKR
115
5.12
Rationality and Extensive Form CKR
118
5.13
OntheNonexistenceofCKR
119
6
The Mixing Problem: Purification and Conjectures
121
6.1
Why Play Mixed Strategies?
121
6.2
Harsanyi s Purification Theorem
123
6.3
A Reputational Model of Honesty and Corruption
125
6.4
Purifying Honesty and Corruption
128
6.5
Epistemic
Games: Mixed Strategies as Conjectures
128
6.6
Resurrecting the Conjecture Approach to Purification
129
7
Bayesian Rationality and Social Epistemology
132
7.1
The Sexes: From Battle to Ballet
133
7.2
The Choreographer Trumps Backward Induction
134
7.3
Property Rights and Correlated Equilibrium
135
7.4
Convention as Correlated Equilibrium
136
7.5
Correlated Strategies and Correlated Equilibria
136
7.6
Correlated Equilibrium and Bayesian Rationality
138
7.7
The Social Epistemology of Common Priors
139
7.8
The Social Epistemology of Common Knowledge
141
7.9
Social Norms
143
7.10
Game Theory and the Evolution of Norms
143
7.11
The Merchants Wares
144
8
Common Knowledge and Nash Equilibrium
146
8.1
Conditions fora Nash Equilibrium in Two-Player Games
146
8.2
A Three-Player Counterexample
147
8.3
The Modal Logic of Common Knowledge
149
8.4
The Commonality of Knowledge
152
8.5
The Tactful Ladies
153
8.6
The Tactful Ladies and the Commonality of Knowledge
156
8.7
Agreeing to Disagree
158
8.8
The Demise of Methodological Individualism
161
χ
Contents
9
Reflective Reason and Equilibrium Refinements
9.1
Perfect, Perfect Bayesian, and Sequential Equilibria
9.2
Incredible Threats
9.3
Unreasonable Perfect Bayesian Equilibria
9.4
The LBR criterion picks out the sequential equilibrium
9.5
Selten s Horse: Sequentiality vs. the LBR criterion
9.6
The Spence Signaling Model
9.7
Irrelevant Node Additions
9.8
Improper Sequential Equilibria
9.9
Second-Order Forward Induction
9.10
Beer and Quiche Without the Intuitive Criterion
9.11
An Unreasonable Perfect Equilibrium
9.12
The Principle of Insufficient Reason
9.13
The Principle of Honest Communication
9.14
Induction: Forward is Robust, Backward is Fragile
10
The Analytics of Human Sociality
10.1
Explaining Cooperation: An Overview
10.2
Bob and Alice Redux
10.3
The Folk Theorem
10.4
The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
10.5
Cooperation with Private Signaling
10.6
One Cheer For the Folk Theorem
10.7
Altruistic Punishing in the Public Goods Game
10.8
The Failure of Models of Self-Regarding Cooperation
11
The Evolution of Property Rights
The Endowment Effect
Territoriality
Property Rights in Young Children
Respect for Possession in Nonhuman Animals
Conditions for a Property Equilibrium
Property and Antiproperty Equilibria
An Antiproperty Equilibrium
Property Rights as Choreographer
1
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
12
The Unification of the Behavioral Sciences
12.1
Gene-Culture Coevolution: The Biological Model
164
166
167
170
171
171
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
179
180
181
181
183
185
188
193
195
197
200
201
201
204
207
207
210
213
217
220
221
223
Contents xi
12.2
Culture
and Physiology of Human Communication
228
12.3
Biological and Cultural Dynamics
229
12.4
The Theory of Norms: The Sociological Model
231
12.5
Socialization and the Internalization of Norms
233
12.6
Rational Choice: The Economic Model
234
12.7
Deliberative Choice: The Psychological Model
236
12.8
Application: Addictive Behavior
238
12.9
Game Theory: The Universal Lexicon of Life
239
12.10
Epistemic
Game Theory and Social Norms
240
12.11
Society as a Complex Adaptive System
242
12.12
Counterpoint: Biology
244
12.13
Counterpoint: Economics
245
12.14
Counterpoint: Psychology
245
12.15
The Behavioral Disciplines Can Be Unified
247
13
Summary
248
14
Table of Symbols
250
References
253
Index
283
Game theory is central to understand¬
ing human behavior and relevant to
all of the behavioral sciences
—
from
biology and economics, to anthropol¬
ogy and political science. However, as
The Bounds of Reason demonstrates,
game theory alone cannot fully explain
human behavior and should instead
complement other key concepts cham¬
pioned by the behavioral disciplines.
Herbert Cintis shows that just as game
theory without broader social theory
is merely technical bravado, so social
theory without game theory is a handi¬
capped enterprise.
Cintis illustrates, for instance, that
game theory lacks explanations for
when and how rational agents share
beliefs. Rather than construct a social
epistemology or reasoning process
that reflects the real world, game theo¬
rists make unwarranted assumptions,
which imply that rational agents enjoy
a commonality of beliefs. But, Cintis ex¬
plains, humans possess unique forms
of knowledge and understanding that
move us beyond being merely rational
creatures to being social creatures. For
a better understanding of human be¬
havior, Cintis champions a unified ap¬
proach and in doing so shows that the
dividing lines between the behavioral
disciplines make no scientific sense. He
asks, for example, why four separate
fields
—
economics, sociology, anthro¬
pology, and social psychology
—
study
social behavior and organization, yet
their basic assumptions are wildly at
variance. The author argues that we
currently have the analytical tools to
render the behavioral disciplines mutu¬
ally coherent.
Combining the strengths of the classi¬
cal, evolutionary, and behavioral fields,
The Bounds of Reason reinvigorates the
useful tools of game theory and offers
innovative thinking for the behavioral
sciences.
HERBERT CINTIS holds faculty posi¬
tions at the Santa Fe Institute, Central
European University, and University of
Siena. He is the author of Game Theory
Evolving (Princeton) and the
coeditor
of numerous books, including Moral
Sentiments and Material Interests, Un¬
equal Chances (Princeton), and Founda¬
tions of Human Sociality.
|
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| discipline | Soziologie Psychologie Mathematik Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| format | Book |
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| id | DE-604.BV035437568 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-12-20T13:32:29Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9780691140520 0691140529 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-017357867 |
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| publisher | Princeton Univ. Press |
| record_format | marc |
| spellingShingle | Gintis, Herbert 1940-2023 The bounds of reason game theory and the unification of the behavioral sciences Jeux, Théorie des ram Sciences sociales - Méthodologie ram Sozialwissenschaften Game theory Practical reason Human behavior Social sciences / Methodology Psychology Verhaltenswissenschaften (DE-588)4133253-2 gnd Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4133253-2 (DE-588)4056243-8 |
| title | The bounds of reason game theory and the unification of the behavioral sciences |
| title_auth | The bounds of reason game theory and the unification of the behavioral sciences |
| title_exact_search | The bounds of reason game theory and the unification of the behavioral sciences |
| title_full | The bounds of reason game theory and the unification of the behavioral sciences Herbert Gintis |
| title_fullStr | The bounds of reason game theory and the unification of the behavioral sciences Herbert Gintis |
| title_full_unstemmed | The bounds of reason game theory and the unification of the behavioral sciences Herbert Gintis |
| title_short | The bounds of reason |
| title_sort | the bounds of reason game theory and the unification of the behavioral sciences |
| title_sub | game theory and the unification of the behavioral sciences |
| topic | Jeux, Théorie des ram Sciences sociales - Méthodologie ram Sozialwissenschaften Game theory Practical reason Human behavior Social sciences / Methodology Psychology Verhaltenswissenschaften (DE-588)4133253-2 gnd Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd |
| topic_facet | Jeux, Théorie des Sciences sociales - Méthodologie Sozialwissenschaften Game theory Practical reason Human behavior Social sciences / Methodology Psychology Verhaltenswissenschaften Spieltheorie |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=017357867&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=017357867&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT gintisherbert theboundsofreasongametheoryandtheunificationofthebehavioralsciences |
Inhaltsverzeichnis
UB Lesesaal Wirtschaft
Signatur notieren und vor Ort nutzen oder für zwei Wochen ausleihen| Signatur: | 40 QH 430 G493 |
|---|---|
| Exemplar 1 | entleihbar Vorhanden |