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Titel:Recht und demokratische Reversibilität
Verfassungstheoretische Legitimation und verfassungsdogmatische Grenzen der Bindung demokratischer Mehrheiten an erschwert änderbares Recht
Person: Hohnerlein, Jakob
aut
Hauptverfasser: Hohnerlein, Jakob (VerfasserIn)
Format: Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:Deutsch
Veröffentlicht: Tübingen Mohr Siebeck 2020
Ausgabe:1. Aufl.
Schriftenreihe:Grundlagen der Rechtswissenschaft 36
Schlagwörter:
Vertrauensschutz > Verfassungsänderung > Treaty Override > Testierfähigkeit > Simulationsverfahren > Verfassungsfunktionen > Pacta sunt servanda > Treaty override > Rechtsphilosophie > Verfassungsrecht und Staatslehre > Völkerrecht > Array
Medienzugang:https://doi.org/10.1628/978-3-16-159131-0
Zusammenfassung:The Law and Democratic Reversibility. Legitimation through Constitutional Theory and the Dogmatic Boundaries of Binding Democratic Majorities to Unyielding Law.
Verfassungsnormen oder auch völkerrechtliche Verträge binden demokratische Politik an früher gesetztes, nur erschwert änderbares Recht. Jakob Hohnerlein untersucht, wann sich solche Bestandsgarantien normativ begründen lassen und zieht daraus Konsequenzen für die Dogmatik des Grundgesetzes.
Rigid constitutional norms, treaties and the like place significant ties on democratic politics. If such norms are not to be condemned as an illegitimate »dead hand of the past«, what contents are they to entrench? Taking Germanys Basic Law as an example, Jakob Hohnerleins study proposes criteria for the normative discussion as well as constitutional doctrine.
Ein zentraler Aspekt demokratischer Politik ist die Möglichkeit, geltendes Recht zu ändern. Gleichwohl haben demokratische Mehrheiten zahlreiche Vorgaben etwa aus Verfassungen und völkerrechtlichen Verträgen zu beachten, die nur in besonders schwerfälligen Verfahren zu ändern sind. Der Kritik, dass rigides Recht in unfairer Weise den Status quo verfestigt, lässt sich nicht durch einen Verweis auf dessen demokratische Entstehung entgehen. Stattdessen untersucht Jakob Hohnerlein, welche Festschreibungen prinzipiell zu rechtfertigen sind, um Defiziten der Tagespolitik entgegenzuwirken. Die theoretische Frage wirkt sich auch auf die Verfassungsinterpretation aus. Für das Grundgesetz zeigt sich, dass ihm jenseits eines bloßen Voluntarismus eine Verfassungskonzeption zugrunde liegt. Hieraus ergeben sich Grenzen neuer Konstitutionalisierungen und Orientierungspunkte, inwieweit eine legislative Selbstbindung aufgrund des Vertrauensschutzes und der Zustimmung zu Verträgen anzuerkennen ist.Die Arbeit wurde mit dem Werner-von-Simson-Preis 2019 ausgezeichnet.
This book explores the concept of democratic reversibility: Democratic majoritiesat any time should be able to change previous democratic decisions. I analyzehow constitutions and other legal forms limit reversibility and how constitutionalinterpretation can help to ensure sufficient democratic dynamics.In modern societies law is a product of contingent political decisions. To belegitimate they must result from a democratic process - and they should be subjectto revision in a new democratic process. If democracy is characterized byopen discussions in representative institutions and the public sphere, decisionscan be no more than a »caesura in an ongoing discussion« (Habermas). The majorityrule is the fairest way to decide when people disagree on the best solution- but only if the minority has the equal chance to become the majority (Kelsen).New generations should not be bound by the will of the dead (Jefferson).However, in modern legal systems democratic reversibility is significantlylimited. They have developed mechanisms to entrench norms, i.e. to take themout of the hands of ordinary democratic decision-making. The very idea of constitutionsis to freeze certain norms. Even if amendments are not precluded by an»eternity clause«, they have to be carried out in a particularly onerous procedure.Typically, a supermajority is required, thus a minority can block any departurefrom the status quo. In a similar vein, the obligations of states from internationaltreaties can in principle only be changed by the consent of all state parties. Moreover,some constitutions require qualified majorities for legislation in certain areas.In many legal orders there are constitutional doctrines according to whichnew legislation must respect previously awarded rights or legitimate expectations.The intensity of all those limits on present majorities to change legal normsenacted in the past varies among legal orders, particularly depending on the existenceof judicial review. But even if entrenched norms are not controlled bycourts, they are normally respected as authoritative in political discussions.How can rigid forms of law be justified? I argue that it is not convincing toattribute legal norms adopted by a qualified majority a democratic superiorityvis-à-vis ordinary laws because it gives the preference to the status quo. A similarconcern holds for the concept of constituent power. It is not plausible to understandthe constitution as the will of the people themselves which should prevailover the will of representative institutions. The idea of relatively fixing certainnorms in a constitution is, rather, that such norms establish a conception to ensurethe legitimacy of laws. This is especially plausible for rules relating to theform of democratic decision-making and the protection of individual rights. Onthe contrary, in a pluralistic society, norms that establish certain conceptions ofthe common good, e.g. cultural institutions or economic principles, should beopen for continuous democratic discussion and easy revisions. The distinction ofnorms for which there are good reasons to entrench them in the constitution fromissues that should be left to daily politics ought to be extended to other forms ofhard law. For example, international treaties may legitimately limit democraticreversibility on the ground of human rights, whereas in the field of economiccooperation there should be mechanisms to enable the adaption or termination ofstates obligations according to the present democratic will.Beyond the theoretical considerations, the book examines the role of constitutionalinterpretation in relation to democratic reversibility. For example, themaking of the German Basic Law can largely be understood not just as bindingfuture majorities to the will of the framers but as transforming legitimacy conceptionsfrom political theory into constitutional law. The task of constitutionalinterpretation is, then, to further develop these ideas. The example of the discussionwhether it was constitutional to introduce same-sex marriage in Germany byamending the civil code only shows us how various constitutional interpretationsmay enhance democratic reversibility in contrast to an originalist reading. Anotherissue examined in this chapter is whether the constitutional amendment procedureof art. 79 GG can be used to constitutionalize any norm by qualified majority.As the »eternity clause« provides protection of the democratic principle, Iargue for a standard of evaluation which determines the admissible scope ofconstitutional amendment relating to its content. The Basic Law contains a conceptionthat certain issues should be regulated in current legislation which maynot be completely abandoned by constitutional amendment.Constitutional interpretation also determines how far the legislature is bounddue to its own decisions. While some scholars understand constitutional limitationsto the reversibility of past laws in an overly broad way, I suggest that limitationsin the name of the protection of legitimate expectations etc. can only bedefended if they aspire to individual rights protections. The promise to keep alaw for a certain time is to be considered but does not lead to a self-inducedfreezing of the law. Another kind of self-binding occurs when treaties are concluded.Whereas the German constitutional court argues that the democraticprinciple implies that legislation can always override treaty obligations, I prefera more nuanced approach. I suggest that one should analyze whether the treatycontains sufficient withdrawal mechanisms and distinguish the content of thetreaty in relation to democratic reversibility.
Beschreibung:PublicationDate: 20200609
Umfang:1 Online-Ressource (XXII, 474 Seiten)
ISBN:9783161591310

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