Gespeichert in:
| Titel: | Algorithmic Tacit Collusion An Analysis under European Competition Law |
|---|---|
| Person: |
Doerr, Adrian
aut |
| Hauptverfasser: | |
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Tübingen
Mohr Siebeck
2025
|
| Ausgabe: | 1. Aufl. |
| Schriftenreihe: | Beiträge zum Kartellrecht
|
| Schlagwörter: |
Free Riders
> Algorithm
> AI
> institutional imperfections
> time and space
> antitrust
> self-preferencing
> Digital Markets Act
> chatbots
> competition law
> Europe
> Elfes-Urteil
> Professoren-Richter
> Selbstbindung der Rechtsprechung
> PSPP-Urteil
> Handels- und Gesellschaftsrecht, Wirtschaftsrecht, Steuerrecht
> Wirtschaftsrecht
> Wettbewerb, Konzentration
> Europarecht
|
| Medienzugang: | https://doi.org/10.1628/978-3-16-164040-7 |
| Zusammenfassung: | Tacit collusion through pricing algorithms is feasible and increasingly likely - and its effects may be as harmful as those of anticompetitive agreements. By virtue of a new approach set out in this study, Adrian Doerr shows how the law can and should respond within the existing legal framework. Stillschweigende Absprachen durch Preisalgorithmen sind möglich und zunehmend wahrscheinlich, können jedoch in ihren Auswirkungen kartellrechtswidrigen Absprachen ähneln. Das Kartellrecht sollte daher dieser Entwicklung innerhalb des bestehenden Rechtsrahmens begegnen. Tacit collusion is a well-studied phenomenon accepted in competition law as an anomaly that only occurs under specific conditions. However, with the rise of artificial intelligence, it is more likely that pricing algorithms could develop the ability to collude in more instances and without human interference. While neither tacit collusion nor its algorithmically induced version constitutes a concerted practice, algorithmic tacit collusion is sufficiently different from a technical, economic, and policy perspective to warrant alternative legal treatment. Algorithmically induced tacit collusion in fact resembles a cartel in its effects and should, in principle, also be treated as such. In his comprehensive study, Adrian Doerr develops a new approach within the existing regulatory framework to keep algorithmic tacit collusion in check. |
| Beschreibung: | PublicationDate: 20250630 |
| Umfang: | 1 Online-Ressource (XXI, 368 Seiten) |
| ISBN: | 9783161640407 |
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| 520 | |a Tacit collusion through pricing algorithms is feasible and increasingly likely - and its effects may be as harmful as those of anticompetitive agreements. By virtue of a new approach set out in this study, Adrian Doerr shows how the law can and should respond within the existing legal framework. | ||
| 520 | |a Stillschweigende Absprachen durch Preisalgorithmen sind möglich und zunehmend wahrscheinlich, können jedoch in ihren Auswirkungen kartellrechtswidrigen Absprachen ähneln. Das Kartellrecht sollte daher dieser Entwicklung innerhalb des bestehenden Rechtsrahmens begegnen. | ||
| 520 | |a Tacit collusion is a well-studied phenomenon accepted in competition law as an anomaly that only occurs under specific conditions. However, with the rise of artificial intelligence, it is more likely that pricing algorithms could develop the ability to collude in more instances and without human interference. While neither tacit collusion nor its algorithmically induced version constitutes a concerted practice, algorithmic tacit collusion is sufficiently different from a technical, economic, and policy perspective to warrant alternative legal treatment. Algorithmically induced tacit collusion in fact resembles a cartel in its effects and should, in principle, also be treated as such. In his comprehensive study, Adrian Doerr develops a new approach within the existing regulatory framework to keep algorithmic tacit collusion in check. | ||
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| spelling | text txt rdacontent computer c rdamedia online resource cr rdacarrier 9783161640391 Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe Druckversion Creative Commons cc cc-by-nc-nd-4.0 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Doerr, Adrian (orcid)0009-0007-0865-1261 aut Algorithmic Tacit Collusion [Elektronische Ressource] : An Analysis under European Competition Law 1. Aufl. Tübingen Mohr Siebeck 2025 1 Online-Ressource (XXI, 368 Seiten) Beiträge zum Kartellrecht PublicationDate: 20250630 Tacit collusion through pricing algorithms is feasible and increasingly likely - and its effects may be as harmful as those of anticompetitive agreements. By virtue of a new approach set out in this study, Adrian Doerr shows how the law can and should respond within the existing legal framework. Stillschweigende Absprachen durch Preisalgorithmen sind möglich und zunehmend wahrscheinlich, können jedoch in ihren Auswirkungen kartellrechtswidrigen Absprachen ähneln. Das Kartellrecht sollte daher dieser Entwicklung innerhalb des bestehenden Rechtsrahmens begegnen. Tacit collusion is a well-studied phenomenon accepted in competition law as an anomaly that only occurs under specific conditions. However, with the rise of artificial intelligence, it is more likely that pricing algorithms could develop the ability to collude in more instances and without human interference. While neither tacit collusion nor its algorithmically induced version constitutes a concerted practice, algorithmic tacit collusion is sufficiently different from a technical, economic, and policy perspective to warrant alternative legal treatment. Algorithmically induced tacit collusion in fact resembles a cartel in its effects and should, in principle, also be treated as such. In his comprehensive study, Adrian Doerr develops a new approach within the existing regulatory framework to keep algorithmic tacit collusion in check. Free Riders Algorithm AI institutional imperfections time and space antitrust self-preferencing Digital Markets Act chatbots competition law Europe Elfes-Urteil Professoren-Richter Selbstbindung der Rechtsprechung PSPP-Urteil Handels- und Gesellschaftsrecht, Wirtschaftsrecht, Steuerrecht Wirtschaftsrecht Wettbewerb, Konzentration Europarecht |
| spellingShingle | Doerr, Adrian Algorithmic Tacit Collusion An Analysis under European Competition Law |
| title | Algorithmic Tacit Collusion An Analysis under European Competition Law |
| title_auth | Algorithmic Tacit Collusion An Analysis under European Competition Law |
| title_exact_search | Algorithmic Tacit Collusion An Analysis under European Competition Law |
| title_full | Algorithmic Tacit Collusion [Elektronische Ressource] : An Analysis under European Competition Law |
| title_fullStr | Algorithmic Tacit Collusion [Elektronische Ressource] : An Analysis under European Competition Law |
| title_full_unstemmed | Algorithmic Tacit Collusion [Elektronische Ressource] : An Analysis under European Competition Law |
| title_short | Algorithmic Tacit Collusion |
| title_sort | algorithmic tacit collusion an analysis under european competition law |
| title_sub | An Analysis under European Competition Law |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT doerradrian algorithmictacitcollusionananalysisundereuropeancompetitionlaw |